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VIRTUS WITHOUT
TELOS, OR THE
ETHICS OF
VULNERABILITY
IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND
Holly A. Crocker
The Pain of Reformation: Spenser,
Vulnerability, and the Ethics of
Masculinity by Joseph Campana.
New York: Fordham University
Press, 2012. Pp. 296. $55.00 cloth.

The Pain of Reformation posits
masculinity as an ethical condition,
not just a social role, in Edmund
Spenser’s 1590 Faerie Queene. This
shift in inquiry highlights heroic
masculinity’s propensity for violence and domination, and suggests
the tensions inherent to a poem that
purports “to fashion a gentleman
or noble person in vertuous and
gentle discipline,” as the “Letter
of the Authors” famously avers.
Rather than a didactic project that
depends on creating an invulnerable masculine subject from the
imposition of codified discipline,
the 1590 Faerie Queene emerges
as poem concerned with vulnerability, including a fundamental
openness to bodily experience. In
Joseph Campana’s deft analysis,
vulnerability becomes “the source
of a new understanding of masculinity and ethics, which might be
united in the term virtue” (8). This
book does not just attend to vulnerability as the underside of violence
in Spenser’s expansive narrative.
Instead, Campana argues that “the
1590 Faerie Queene is in fact an
allegory of vulnerability, one that
disarms and reforms masculinity as
a project of ethics” (204). Violence
becomes subject to critique, and
the programmatic habitus of traditional virtue is superseded by a
reformed model of masculinity
attuned to pain and suffering as
well as pleasure and joy.
Sensation, not governance,
organizes this new masculinity.
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While Campana acknowledges
that a powerful Protestant ethos
runs through Spenser’s poem, he
connects this militant form of selfmastery to the trauma of violence
suffered in the wake of England’s
break with Rome. The violence
of the Reformation suggests that
an impervious moral identity is
only a meager defense against, and
therefore an insufficient solution
to, the experience of pain wrought
by decades of religious upheaval.
Spenser instead elaborates what
Campana calls a “sympathetic sociality” (168 passim), which might
mend the harms of a community
rent by generations of suffering.
An ethics founded on an acknowledgment of shared vulnerability
reforms the heroic masculine subject and provides new grounds for
ethical action that acknowledges
the bodily experiences of all those
involved.
As exemplars of this reformation, the knights of the 1590
Faerie Queene are caught in a bind
between inviolable heroism and
vulnerable compassion. Campana
identifies this aporia as characteristic of sixteenth-century poetry,
so that Spenser’s effort to create an
aesthetics that expresses the flesh’s
sensitivities as a new foundation for
ethical action is rendered through
the struggles of the Knights
of Holiness, Temperance, and
Chastity. To reformulate masculinity as an ethical condition—one
that re-members classical virtus—is

to create a new model of virtue
responsive to the Reformation’s
manifold harms. Rather than
predicating ethical life on prescriptive norms or moralistic rules, virtue, as Campana analyzes it across
Spenser’s 1590 narrative, emerges
from shared relations of affect,
energy, and sensation. Rethinking
Spenser’s ethical project makes a
profound difference to the ways we
might read the Legends of Holiness,
Temperance, and Chastity.
In charting Redcrosse Knight’s
difficulties in book 1, Campana
acknowledges the appeal of a
dematerializing moral regime that
asserts control over pain, violence,
and suffering. Yet, even if we recognize the defensive reassurance
that the fantasy of rational control
over insensate matter might hold,
a series of unsettling encounters in
the Legend of Holiness works to
undermine this model of masculine virtue. Chapter 1, “Reading
Bleeding Trees: The Poetics of
Other People’s Pain,” focuses on
the Redcrosse Knight’s inability to
respond to the suffering of others,
and questions “how we witness and
respond to violence” even when that
violence is supposedly sanctioned as
part of the purifying process of ethical reform (73). Campana connects
the episode in which Redcrosse
Knight encounters a bleeding tree
with the iconoclastic violence of
England’s early decades of religious Reformation, and argues that
the Knight of Holiness’s inability
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to bear compassionate witness to
the imprisoned Fradubio’s pain
presents the problem of “suffering matter” (19) after Christ’s passion was culturally displaced in the
Protestant imaginary.
When Fradubio’s pain is made
tangible through the bleeding
flesh of the tree, it unsettles a traditional model of heroic virtue by
capturing “the shock of masculinity faced with a materiality that is
neither docile nor silent” (57). If
the House of Holiness incorporates the Redcrosse Knight into
Protestant theology with its programmatic discipline, that body,
Campana’s analysis demonstrates,
is stripped of all flesh. Instead,
the body becomes “emblematic”
in a way that bares the losses that
a martial Christianity imposes
on the subjects it fashions. Cut
off from sympathy and suffering, Redcrosse Knight defeats the
dragon and uncovers the “virtuous violence” (72) that iconoclastic righteousness seeks to justify.
Spenser pursues the underside of
this zealous discipline in chapter 2, “Spenser’s Dark Materials:
Representation in the Shadow of
Christ.” In so doing, Campana
offers a powerful explanation for
one of the poem’s enduring enigmas: the poem’s dazzling visuality,
including book 1’s ocular fascination with a series of powerfully
rendered monsters.
How can an ethical poetics
aligned with martial Christian
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iconoclasm lavish so much energy
on allegorical creatures that excite
and sometimes overwhelm the
senses? Moralizing self-cultivation
fails to defend against the revulsions of Error or the horrors of
the dragon. Malevolent figures
including Duessa, Archimago,
and Orgoglio, moreover, present
poetry’s elemental materiality, its
potential to evoke physical presence
even in a religious milieu where
Christ’s body has receded into the
folds of textual representation.
As Campana eloquently argues,
“Lurking behind terrible demons
and evil specters of the Legend of
Holiness is a fundamental materiality in which Spenser locates a
vitality that animates subjective,
sensuous experience and the poetry
that colors and conveys that experience” (78). This is not dead, mechanized matter, though Campana
elaborates differences between
monster and machine to address
the lively material presence that is
banished by a routinized ordering
of wayward or monstrous bodies. Mechanization reduces matter’s generative vitality to its barest
technical functions. When the
Redcrosse Knight stumbles, or is
overcome with monstrosity’s generative materiality, Spenser investigates what it might mean to found
an ethical masculinity that preserves the many fragilities of physicality. In other words, “Redcrosse’s
virtue is not his struggle against the
flesh, but his struggle to be flesh
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and not an empty allegorical body”
(104).
Campana’s investigation of the
Legend of Temperance continues
to consider poetry’s materiality by
contemplating the intensities of the
body enfleshed. Instead of treating
temperance as simple privation,
part 2 elaborates an alternative conception that focuses on the body’s
energies and affects. By so doing,
Campana argues that Spenser
offers “a thorough critique of an
ideology of temperance embodied
by Guyon and the Palmer, who
model the moderation of affect
and the expropriation of energy by
which heroic subjects are alienated
from their own bodies and dedicated, quite violently, to the cause
of virtue” (131). Chapter 3, “On
Not Defending Poetry: Spenser,
Suffering, and the Energy of
Affect,” connects the body’s vitality
to a poetics that resists moral clarity in favor of ethical resonance.
A focus on the body’s energy—its
enervation and its excess—allows
Spenser to avoid the poetic gesture, practiced so famously by
Philip Sidney, that defends poetry
by associating it with the clarifying ethical force required to cultivate a heroic subject. As Campana
suggests, “For [Spenser], the value
of poetry derives neither from its
moral and mimetic properties nor
from its ability to reflect or refer to
social experience but, rather, from
its capacity to convey the vitality of
bodies endowed with pain, affect,

a vulnerability to change, and a
capacity for motion” (114).
The body’s economy, its flows
of vitality that run to overflow or
depletion, is the source of Guyon’s
struggle in book 2 of the 1590
Faerie Queene. Guyon’s witness
to Amavia’s death, along with his
experience in the cave of Mammon,
demonstrate the dangers of extreme
deprivation. Whereas the dying
Amavia should affirm affect’s
power to connect bodies through
shared experiences of intensity, the
unfeeling response of Guyon and
the Palmer critiques the impulse
to deny oneself a sympathetic sociality in the interests of constructing a moral exemplum with crisp
narrative contours. A different
form of ethical impoverishment
is at work in the much-studied
cave of Mammon episode: after
Guyon denies himself all forms of
sustenance for three days, he very
famously collapses after he leaves
the cave. Though he seeks to practice a martial form of Temperance
that disciplines the body’s affective intensities, his response to his
experience affirms affect’s ability
to overflow the strict boundaries
one might seek to set for it: in other
words, the very act of extreme
deprivation becomes an occasion
for affect’s acute excitation. In both
instances, inattention to the body’s
economy of energy—particularly
the way its expenditure and accumulation of vitality might affect
its ethical capacities—produces
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an immoderate and therefore
intemperate physical response.
Chapter 4, “Boy Toys and
Liquid Joys: Pleasure and Power
in the Bower of Bliss,” turns to the
pleasures of bodily intensity that
Temperance might traditionally
have been imagined to squelch. In
continuing the previous chapter’s
focus on the body’s economy, however, Campana argues the “pleasurable liquidity … that appears
with increasing prominence in the
Legend of Temperance” is central to Spenser’s reformulation of
heroic masculinity as disarmed,
vulnerable, and open to the vicissitudes of corporeal experience
(130). Similar to his treatment of
monsters in part 1, Campana asks
why Spenser spends so much poetic
energy on masculine pleasure if
book 2 of the 1590 Faerie Queene
is unflinching in its pursuit of a
totalizing moral program of moderating discipline. Here we see that
pleasure “renders the masculine
heroic body vulnerable to experience” (137). As a consequence, all
those pleasured male bodies in the
Legend of Temperance—which
are frequently treated as abject or
marginal—are central to an ethics that includes all varieties of
lived corporeality. If temperance
does not amount to denial, then
we should question the ready association of figures such as Mordant
with effeminate powerlessness.
These “boy toys” might clarify the
dangers of bodily enervation, but
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Guyon’s destruction of the Bower
of Bliss divides him from pleasures
that might be ethically enriching.
Such violent energies are at odds
with the poem’s purpose, which,
Campana powerfully argues, “is to
defeat varieties of alienation that
render pleasure or pain a form of
stupefaction, which disables the
body’s vulnerability to the experiential and ethical dimensions available in common corporeality” (158).
Part 3 of Campana’s excellent
study pursues “common corporeality” in book 3 of the 1590 Faerie
Queene by addressing Spenser’s
endeavor to develop a “sympathetic sociality” in the Legend of
Chastity. This productive emphasis on shared vulnerability emerges
mainly through the friendships
of female characters. And, while
Campana continues to argue for
the reformation of the heroic
masculine subject, his analysis
of Britomart’s emergence as the
exemplar of an ethical vulnerability
shows that Spenser’s reworking of
virtus is more comprehensive than
his project “to fashion a gentleman”
might explicitly allow. Chapter 5,
“Vulnerable Subjects: Amoret’s
Agony, Britomart’s Battle for
Chastity,” traces the Knight of
Chastity’s transformation from
unfeeling to sympathetic witness
of others’ suffering. By realizing
that those in pain need sympathy more than rescue, Britomart
gains an access to corporeal experience that ultimately reformulates

352

Holly A. Crocker

heroic masculinity. When she
seeks to be (rather than to possess)
her beloved, vulnerability comes
to define her experience in ways
that open her to others. She might
ignore Florimell’s pain early in her
quest, but later she becomes the
paragon of a vulnerable masculinity whose heroism is predicated
on mutuality. Britomart’s relationship with Amoret becomes “a bond
based on affection and sympathy”
(200), which remakes both partners through their collaborative
renegotiation of the roles of rescuer
and lady that populate traditional
romance narratives. Their bond
disarms Britomart, and makes
way for the kinds of “compassionate companionship” that Spenser
imagines elsewhere in book 3 (203).
In chapter 6, “Damaged Gods:
Adonis and the Pain of Allegory,”
Campana addresses how Spenser
imagines another important bond
between women, but here the collaboration between Venus and
Diana produces vulnerable masculinity as the most idealized figure
of the “new man” in late-sixteenthcentury England. By replacing the
martial Mars with the vulnerable
Adonis, Spenser revises traditional
gender hierarchies in a fashion
that expands both masculinity and
femininity. Masculinity is no longer
sullied by an association between
vulnerability and effeminacy;
likewise, femininity is no longer
tainted by a connection between
materiality and passivity. If flesh

is lively, vulnerability may also be
recognized as a source of strength.
This strength emerges from collaboration and from a recognition
that bodies are always mutually
enriching or damaging. In assessing the recalibration of gender that
the Garden of Adonis achieves,
Campana concludes his discussion
of book 3 by returning to the form
of suffering that launches his analysis of Spenser’s Legend of Holiness
early on:
Born from a bleeding tree,
Adonis embodies, too, a
vision of matter endowed
with life. If suffering, the
quickening experience of
pain, served as a reminder
of all that was suppressed in
the machine of the Protestant
allegorizing of the flesh,
Spenser’s damaged divinities, especially Adonis, introduce that vulnerability into
the texture of allegory by disarming this disembodying
hierarchical violence. (223)
By figuring heroic masculinity as
implicitly vulnerable, Spenser reimagines virtue as corporeal and
collaborative.
Campana’s argument is tightly
drawn, so much so that he uses his
conclusion to imagine other avenues of inquiry. In looking forward
to Spenser’s return to The Faerie
Queene in its later instantiations,
Campana focuses on the potential
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of shame as the impulse unifying
the Legends of Friendship, Justice,
and Courtesy. In so doing,
Campana observes shame’s duality:
“Spenser wielded rather effectively
the forces of shame in the interest
of maintaining a sense of order, but
he also keenly observed shame as
a form of social vulnerability (231,
original emphasis). The extended
legends that comprise the 1596
Faerie Queene make the ethical vulnerability their protagonists come
to experience manifestly social. As
a consequence, the networks of
collaboration become more extensive, and shame gives private vulnerability a socially recognizable
iteration. A focus on shame has an
explicit politics that Campana links
to Spenser’s relationship to Ireland.
Because “Shame names the social
pain of thwarted attachment,” it
gives shape to those affects, energies, and affiliations that arise
“from the failure to sustain an ethics of vulnerability” (236). When
social attachments fail, when they
become suffused with aggression
and violence, shame continues to
express the vulnerability that might
lead to a reparative reassessment
of communal connections. While
tracing future lines of argument,
Campana affirms the innovation and importance of his present
project.
The Pain of Reformation is a
thrilling book. It is firmly founded
upon established arguments in
Spenser studies, but it takes those
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accepted positions—about r eligion,
violence, and gender—and shifts
the grounds of understanding.
Some readers might be unpersuaded that Spenser means to critique his knights for assuming
a militant Protestant masculinity. Nonetheless, the Knights of
Holiness and Temperance are customarily viewed as failures, at least
in the early stages of each quest.
Britomart’s success as a virtuous
exemplar, too, is simply another
variation on a long-accepted characteristic of the 1590 Faerie Queene.
What Campana’s study achieves,
I would suggest, is virtus without
telos: when vulnerability becomes
central to rethinking ethical relations, virtue is always in process,
since the body’s affects and energies, pleasures and pains, never
reach a point of stasis until the
point of death. There is no achieving virtue as a finished product;
even Britomart’s quest relies on
the contingencies of corporeality.
With this reworking of virtue as
a continual struggle rooted in the
body’s sensory capacities, Campana
recasts the 1590 Faerie Queene
as a series of episodes in a much
larger and longer ethical quest.
By so doing, Campana affirms
Spenser’s moral seriousness and
formal inventiveness; he does so,
importantly, by opening space for
an ambitious rethinking of virtue
and gender in the ongoing wake of
England’s religious Reformation.
This book is relevant, then, not just
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to Spenserians, but to all scholars
interested in investigating the difference that vulnerability might
make to poetry’s influence over
lived corporeal experience in early
modern England.

Holly A. Crocker, who is professor of English
at the University of South Carolina, writes
on gender, affect, and ethics in premodern England. She is currently completing
a book entitled “The Matter of Virtue:
Women’s Ethical Action from Chaucer to
Shakespeare.”

